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  5 
The democratization and marketization of East European states following the 
collapse of communism was launched in 1989 on the borders of the world’s 
most highly institutionalized and rule-constrained project of regional 
cooperation, the European Union (EU).* The first ten years of transition offer a 
unique laboratory for studying the influence of international actors on the 
democratization process. The enormous benefits and demanding requirements of 
EU membership created conditions for the unprecedented influence of an 
international institution on the domestic policy choices of aspiring member 
states. Yet the prospect of EU membership did not exert equal traction on the 
domestic politics of all East European states.1 If membership signified such 
substantial benefits, why do we find so much variation in the quality of the 
efforts of credible EU candidates to meet the EU’s entry requirements? 
 
  Euroskeptics and realists alike consider that the EU is projecting its 
economic and political might eastward by way of the accession process; its 
ability to impose rules and dominate domestic politics is therefore a function of 
the feebleness of local elites, too weak to protect their sovereignty. Closer 
observers of the EU accession process consider that the relative progress of 
postcommunist candidates toward meeting the requirements of EU membership 
is a function of their economic strength at the moment of democratization in 
1989, or a function of their geographical distance from the EU’s eastern border. 
But the empirical record shows that variation in how candidates respond to the 
incentives of EU membership cannot be explained by political weakness in the 
face of regional hegemony, or indeed solely by economic prowess in the face of 
tough requirements. 
 
I demonstrate that domestic politics determine how ruling elites respond 
to the incentives of EU membership, confirming the hypothesis of liberal theory 
that the substantive content of foreign as well as domestic policy is shaped by 
state-society relations. Ruling elites vary significantly in how well they translate 
the preferences of society for EU membership into appropriate domestic and 
foreign policies. The key explanatory variable is the presence or absence of a 
strong opposition to communism, which determines whether democratizing 
states fall into what I term a “liberal” or a “nationalist” pattern of political 
                                                 
* For comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Michael Doyle, Thomas Ertman, Matthew 
Evangelista, Karen Ferree, Roy Ginsberg, Peter Hall, Stephen Holmes, Petr Jehlicka, Elena 
Jileva, Judith Kelley, Michael Leigh, Andrew Moravcsik, Martin Rhodes, Thomas Risse, 
Richard Rose, Philippe Schmitter and Timothy Snyder. I thank as well participants in 
seminars of the European Forum at the European University Institute, the Center for 
European Studies at Harvard University, the European Union Center of New York at 
Columbia University, and the Center for International Studies at Princeton University. 
1 I use the blunt label “East European states” to designate those states of the former Soviet 
bloc that are plausible candidates for EU membership. Alternative labels are geopolitically 
more progressive, but cumbersome and unnecessary in this article. 
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 change. Six states are considered here: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. While all six governments declared EU 
membership as a foreign policy goal, nationalist pattern governments 
distinguished themselves from liberal pattern ones by jeopardizing their state’s 
progress toward EU membership. They did so by adopting domestic political 
strategies characterized by ethnic nationalism and economic corruption that were 
incompatible with the EU’s requirements of liberal democracy and 
comprehensive economic reform. 
  
I introduce the concepts of “passive” and “active” leverage to unpack the 
kinds of influence that the EU can have on credible future members. By passive 
leverage I mean the attraction of EU membership, and by active leverage I mean 
the deliberate conditionality exercised in the EU’s pre-accession process. I also 
identify two distinct periods of EU leverage on East European states: the first is 
from 1989 to 1994, and the second from 1995 to 1999. The first period ends 
when the EU begins to project active as well as passive leverage on East 
European states.  
 
During the first period (1989-94), even as the incentives of EU 
membership became clear, I argue that the EU’s role in determining whether a 
state embarked on a “liberal” or a “nationalist” pattern of political change was 
marginal.  The EU’s passive leverage only reinforced existing domestic 
strategies of reform in liberal pattern states, while in nationalist pattern states it 
failed to avert rent-seeking behavior. Pressure from the EU and other 
international institutions had virtually no success in changing the domestic 
policy choices of ruling nationalists, for example in improving government 
policy on ethnic minority rights.  
 
This is surprising given the expectation that Europe’s international 
institutions would be intimately involved in building Europe’s new 
democracies.2  But much of the democratization and international political 
economy literature similarly finds little evidence that external actors ever “tip 
the political scales in favor of reform” by using conditionality to change elite 
behavior.3 In Southern Europe, for example, Philippe Schmitter observed that 
“the immediate prospects for political democracy were largely to be explained in 
terms of national forces and calculations.”4    
  
Given the growing magnetism of a really enlarging EU, does this 
skepticism hold true for postcommunist Europe for all of the 1990s? Do 
                                                 
2 It is also in contrast to the tremendous influence of the Soviet Union, an external actor, on 
its east European satellites and on the timing of their democratic revolutions. See Linz and 
Stepan 1996, 235-244. 
3 Haggard and Webb 1994, 5. See also Kahler 1992 and Bunce 1999. 
4 Schmitter 1986, 5. 
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the costs of exclusion become clear? I show that during the second period 
(1995-1999), the incentives of EU membership (passive leverage) combined 
with the increasingly explicit conditionality of the EU accession process (active 
leverage) were causally important in shaping domestic political change in 
nationalist pattern states. By the mid-1990s, society’s growing awareness of the 
benefits of EU membership had been reinforced by the EU’s vocal 
condemnation of governments that failed to meet EU requirements and by their 
subsequent exclusion from the EU’s accession negotiations. 
 
  EU leverage helped remove rent-seeking nationalists from office by 
tarnishing their Westernizing image, and by supplying EU membership (or 
simply “Europe”) as a convincing electoral platform for emerging moderate 
parties. The prospect of EU membership made the pro-Western center of the 
political spectrum more attractive to voters, while Western actors coached 
opposition elites on how to alter the domestic debate about reform. As a result, 
nationalist pattern governments were replaced by pro-Western reformers in 
elections in Romania in 1996, in Bulgaria in 1997, and in Slovakia in 1998. 
Later, in Croatia and in Serbia in 2000, nationalist pattern governments lost 
power in much the same way. In all five instances, the conduits for international 
influence on domestic politics were the electorate and the opposition, not the 
government. 
  
Many studies in comparative politics find that once initial political and 
institutional choices have been made, the realities created by these choices make 
it difficult to change course. Analyzing domestic politics in the six East 
European states, I examine political behavior in the first months of the 
institutional (re)birth of democracy to help explain the subsequent quality of 
democracy. But I go one step back to argue that whether the opposition to 
communism was strong enough to take power in 1989 all but determined which 
political strategies were most effective in this period. I also go one step forward 
to demonstrate that domestic actors do not just react differently to the incentives 
of EU membership: eventually they are also shaped by them. The traction of the 
EU is so great that it can play a crucial role in pushing states away from one 
pattern of political change toward another. 
    
How can we account for the EU’s influence on the course of 
democratization in Eastern Europe? For any institution, I hypothesize that the 
greater the benefits of membership, the greater the potential political will to 
satisfy intrusive membership requirements on the part of plausible future 
member states. In the case of the EU, I show that the tremendous benefits 
combined with the extensive requirements of membership set the stage for the 
EU’s substantial leverage. The merit-based character of the EU’s pre-accession 
process is also important: Any European state that can fulfill the EU’s clearly 
5 RSC 2001/33 © 2001 Milada Anna Vachudova specified entry requirements is promised membership. While the scope for 
political interference by existing EU members is great, the rules of the pre-
accession process constrain this interference while encouraging all East 
European states to make a bid for membership.  
  
This article proceeds in three parts. The first explains the character of the 
EU’s leverage upon aspiring member states. The second examines the responses 
of democratizing states in Eastern Europe to the EU’s membership incentives in 
the first period from 1989 to 1994, when international factors played a 
negligible role in determining the course of democratic politics. The third 
reveals how the EU’s active and passive leverage influenced these responses and 
materially affected the course of domestic political change in the second period 
from 1995 to 1999. 
 
1. THE SOURCES OF EU LEVERAGE  
 
By 1999 the EU had assembled an impressive list of thirteen officially 
recognized candidates and five proto-candidates for membership. Negotiations 
began in 1998 with Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and 
Cyprus, and in 2000 with Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Malta. Turkey also became an official candidate in 1999, although the start of 
the negotiations was postponed due to insufficient domestic reform. Meanwhile, 
the EU-led Stability Pact of 1999 promised Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Bosnia-Herzegovina candidate status 
as soon as democratic standards and economic requirements are met.  
 
The debate has only just begun about how well existing theories of 
European integration and international relations account for the decision of the 
EU-15 to proceed with such a vast and ambitious enlargement. Enlargement on 
such a scale cannot easily be explained in terms of economic interest. 5 For the 
EU’s existing member states, the economic benefits of enlargement are diffuse, 
long-term and, for voters, politically unremarkable. The costs, however, are 
concentrated, immediate and politically sensitive.6 Meanwhile, for EU leaders, 
the institutional and budgetary reforms necessary to pave the way for 
enlargement are evidently a wrenching task. There is much to say, but the focus 
of this article is on how the EU’s accession process has impacted domestic 
politics in Eastern Europe – and not on how this process can be reconciled with 
domestic politics and foreign ambition in Western Europe.  
 
Since international actors have generally been found to influence 
democratization only on the margins, it is worth exploring now the 
                                                 
5 See Schimmelfennig 2001; and Vachudova 2001(b). 
6 For an excellent assessment of the benefits and costs of enlargement for the EU 15, Grabbe 
2001. 
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substantial. As Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner observed, “we lack a 
sufficient theoretical understanding of the conditions under which membership 
[in a preferential trade agreement] is used to prompt liberalizing reforms and the 
factors affecting the success of such efforts.”7  
 
I show that the leverage on credible candidates that membership 
incentives afford an institution varies according to two factors specific to the 
institution itself: the significance of the benefits of membership and the 
magnitude of the entry requirements. The greater the benefits of membership, 
the greater the potential political will in applicant countries to satisfy intrusive 
political and economic requirements. It is the substantial benefits combined with 
the enormous requirements of membership that set the stage for the EU’s 
leverage on the domestic politics of aspiring member states. At no time in 
history have sovereign states voluntarily agreed to meet such vast domestic 
requirements and then subjected themselves to such intrusive verification 
procedures to enter an international institution. Lets look in turn, briefly, at the 
benefits and the requirements of EU membership 
 
Candidates Envision Benefits from Membership 
 
The EU is attractive as a welfare-enhancing common market and a security-
enhancing political community. For states, the political reasons for joining the 
EU – centered on the reduction of uncertainty in order to increase prosperity – 
are much the same as the reasons international relations scholars have long 
argued for creating institutions.8 For states emerging from communism in 1989, 
the EU was closely associated with the democratic stability and prosperity of 
Western Europe. Opposition elites who had spent years battling communism and 
plotting an exit from the Soviet bloc hailed EU membership as the final marker 
of their country’s escape from Moscow’s control and its “return to Europe.” 
Questions of cultural and civilizational affinity however soon formed only a 
backdrop to the questions of trade and economic adjustment which dominated 
relations between East European states and the EU in the 1990s. Access to the 
EU market was essential to the success of the transition from state socialism to 
market capitalism. But EU negotiators of the so-called “Europe Agreements” 
with East European states acted decisively to protect the interests of powerful 
producer groups within the member states.9 
 
  The negotiation and implementation of the Europe Agreements 
highlighted the power discrepancy between the EU and its eastern neighbors, 
and impressed upon East European political leaders the imperative of full 
                                                 
7 Mansfield and Milner 1999, 607. 
8 Pierson 1996, 129.  
9 Rollo and Smith 1993, 165; and Faini and Portes 1995, 16-17. 
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right. But the process of seeking market access instructed East European elites 
on both the weakness of their position and the only possibility of a remedy: a 
place at the EU table.11  The full benefits of the world's most rule-constrained 
international institution could only be gained by membership.  
 
  Most important, joining the EU would regulate relations with powerful 
neighbors by way of a desirable set of clear and well-established rules. 
Hoffmann and Keohane describe a new institutional form that enables “rich and 
strong states to act more effectively on a collective basis, and [permits] poor and 
weak countries to gain acceptance into a club of prosperous states, governed by 
rules that apply to all members.12 Indeed, the debate within international 
relations about whether and how multilateral institutions influence state 
strategies unites institutionalists and realists on the importance of rules for weak 
states. The rules of institutions "may create a presumption in favor of the norm 
that principles of conduct must be generalized to all members of the institution, 
imparting greater consistency of behavior and favoring weaker states."13 
Similarly, weaker states may favor institutionalized relations with their stronger 
partners if the rules “provide sufficient opportunities for them to voice their 
concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their 
domination by stronger partners.”14  
 
East European states realized quickly that since they depended on trade 
with the EU, without membership they would have to adjust to rules governing 
access to the EU market but could have no hand in writing these rules nor any 
voice in the EU’s affairs.15 The behavior of the candidate states supports Andrew 
Hurrell’s argument that "the more prepared the dominant power is to accept a 
rule-constrained hegemonic order, the more acceptable is a strategy of 
                                                 
10 While the EU projected the aggregate special economic interests of its members in its 
external trade policy, the commitment to rules did dampen the ability of member governments 
to use foreign economic policies to bully small neighbors for nationalistic ends. Thus Bonn in 
the 1990s was unable to use access to the critical German market to coerce special 
compensation for Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia and Poland after World War Two. 
Thus Greece was eventually forced to desist in its trade blockade against Macedonia, and 
Italy was similarly pressured into moderating its intimidation of Slovenia. 
11 To give another example, in the early 1990s when the EU imposed an embargo on the FRY, 
Bulgaria and Romania bore a great deal of the cost. But not being EU members they had no 
bargaining power and received virtually no compensation. Preferential trade arrangements 
provide a forum within which members may negotiate compensation for those senders that 
bear the brunt of the sanction-related costs. See Mansfield 1994, 129.  
12 Hoffmann and Keohane 1993, 388. 
13 Keohane 1993, 296. See also Ruggie 1992, 570-71. 
14 Grieco 1995, 34; and Keohane 1993, 293-294. 
15 On "unilateral adjustment" to EU trade rules, Nicolaidis 1993, 196-245.  
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institutional form that makes “incorporation” an acceptable strategy for 
candidates (even though it is far from clear that all of the EU’s most powerful 
members are supporters of enlargement). 
 
Excluded Candidates Incur Costs 
 
For East European states that fail to enter an enlarging EU along with their 
neighbors, the economic consequences of exclusion will be grave. A steady flow 
of money, expertise, and foreign direct investment will be diverted away from 
states that do not join towards those that do.17 The terms of trade will also bear 
the costs of exclusion as exports to the EU will run the risk of incurring various 
forms of contingent protection, while market access for agricultural goods will 
remain restricted. This takes on unusual importance given the sheer size of the 
EU market and the striking poverty of the proximate alternatives, particularly of 
the post-Soviet market. The prosperity of Portugal, Ireland and Greece bears 
witness to the overall economic benefits of EU accession for relatively poor 
countries. For these countries, EU membership brought economic 
modernization, access to new export markets and improvements in the 
regulatory environment as well as transfer payments that were macro-
economically significant. For East European entrants, these payments will be 
substantial even if, as now seems likely, they receive lower subsidies from the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and from the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds than did the previous economic laggards to join the EU. 
 
  There are few persuasive economic arguments against EU membership for 
East European states. A possible advantage of staying outside of the EU is the 
ability to protect national industries and small-scale farming from outside 
competition. But the imperative of exporting to the EU has prompted most East 
European states to sign trade agreements which, as described above, have 
already supplied domestic markets with Western industrial and agricultural 
goods in response to high consumer demand. Pulling out of these agreements – 
or having never signed them – would cause economic disruptions far more 
substantial than the benefits of aggressive protectionism as it would further 
restrict access to the critical EU market while delaying structural reform and 
frustrating consumer demand for Western products. 
 
  The majority of the economic reforms demanded by the EU, including the 
withdrawal of the state from many areas of the economy, are also advised by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of the transition 
to market capitalism. For postcommunist states, the drive to EU membership, by 
                                                 
16 Hurrell 1995, 343. See also Kupchan 1998. 
17 See Grabbe 2001, 30-32.  
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economy. In all, some three quarters of the requirements of EU membership are 
consistent with reforms that most observers would consider necessary to build a 
stable liberal democracy and a functioning market economy.  
 
Most important, the conditionality of EU membership helps inspire 
reform of the judiciary, the civil service and other arms of the state 
administration where political inertia might otherwise block reform.18 Pressure 
from Brussels acts as a temporary surrogate for pressure from private groups by 
promoting reforms which are in the interest of the public and the state, but not in 
the interest of bureaucracies or governing elites.19 At the same time, the 
imperative of meeting EU requirements provides politicians with a powerful 
rationale for pushing through economic reforms that, at least in the short-term, 
have negative repercussions for substantial portions of the electorate. Finally, 
the EU accession process empowers domestic actors who support EU 
membership and constrains the power of anti-Western actors in society, the state 
administration and the parliament.20 
  
In addition to the economic rewards of membership and to the political 
benefits of conditionality, there are vague but important security incentives at 
play. As the Warsaw Pact dissolved, NATO emerged as the most effective 
purveyor of security in Europe, and a state’s prospects for NATO membership 
became linked to its standing with the EU.21 For states excluded from the 1997 
expansion of NATO, EU membership became a surrogate source of security, 
especially for the Baltic states whose previous inclusion in the Soviet bloc made 
future NATO membership less likely. 
 
                                                 
18 See Dimitrova 2001. 
19 The EU, however, will function badly in the long term as a substitute for civil society. 
Reforms that determine the character and scope of government need to be worked out 
indigenously so that a polity “owns” and therefore complies with its rules. Also, states that 
develop specialized and powerful interest groups will perform better as members of the EU 
and as players in the transnational economy. 
20 For a similar argument, Goldstein 1996. 
21 On trade blocs as historically comprised of political-military allies, Mansfield 1994, 123. 
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Together with the economic and political incentives of membership, it is the 
extensive requirements of membership that afford the EU unprecedented 
leverage over the domestic politics of aspiring member states.  The power 
asymmetry exposed by trade relations between the EU and neighboring states 
becomes even more stark when these states choose to take part in the “pre-
accession process”: the requirements for accession are massive, they are non-
negotiable, they are uniformly applied and they are closely enforced. All of the 
candidates are subject to the same requirements and are evaluated in a manner 
that has so far proved to be more or less meritocratic.  
 
That the Commission created this “meritocratic” process for enlargement 
has had unintended consequences for existing EU members. Any state that can 
prove itself “European” and that can meet the requirements must be considered a 
credible future member, or else the process must be scrapped. In 1996, few 
imagined an officially-recognized membership queue of more than 8 or 10 
states. In 2001, the number is 18 and rising. This invites investigation of how the 
Commission’s de facto control of the accession process has created “gaps” in 
member state control of the course of European integration. 22 Since enlargement 
increases the policy competence of the Commission, it has logically become an 
advocate of continuing enlargement and has protected the negotiation process 
from the episodic demands of individual EU member states. 
 
The requirements that animate the EU’s pre-accession process reflect a 
broad consensus in favor of liberal democracy, market capitalism and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. 23 Adopted at the Copenhagen summit in June 
1993, the Copenhagen criteria for aspiring members call for the stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
protection of minority rights. This is remarkable, for it allows the EU to judge 
the quality of democracy, the treatment of ethnic minorities and, in practice, the 
sagacity of foreign policy in aspiring members – even though existing members 
have adopted only superficial measures to regulate and harmonize their own 
behavior in these areas.24 The Copenhagen criteria also call for a functioning 
market economy able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces 
                                                 
22 Following the argument of Pierson 1996. 
23 On the pre-accession process, Grabbe 1999; Mayhew 1998; Senior-Nello and Smith 1998; 
Zielonka 1999. For the Opinions, Regular Reports, Accession Partnerships and other 
Commission documents related to the pre-accession process, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/. 
24 For many years, the Copenhagen criteria had no legal grounding in the EU treaties. This 
was ameliorated somewhat by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, of which Article 6 requires 
members to meet certain democratic standards and Article 7 provides for the exclusion from 
voting in the Council of those who fall short. 
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“acquis communautaire”). The clearest case of an enduring double-standard is in 
the protection of ethnic minority rights: while EU institutions play no role in 
how ethnic minorities are treated in the fifteen member states, the EU evaluates 
how they are treated in the candidate states.25 
  
The requirements also reflect the high degree of integration among 
existing member states, which is expressed in some 80,000 pages of the acquis 
communautaire. The substance of the acquis cannot be modified by the 
candidates in any way. Negotiations between the EU member states and the 
candidate states are structured around the transposition of the acquis, divided 
into 29 substantive chapters. The EU’s negotiating position is that the entire 
acquis must be adopted and implemented at the moment of accession. In a 
process called “screening,” the Commission scrutinizes to what extent the 
legislative norms and standards have already been adopted. As reforms are 
completed or at least promised, chapters are provisionally closed and the 
negotiations advance. The only matters open to bargaining are whether, and on 
what terms, transition periods will be accepted for new members in adopting 
difficult parts of the acquis (and for old members in paying out monies from the 
EU’s agricultural and regional development funds).26 
  
The requirements are not just extensive, bearing on virtually every aspect 
of the work of a national government, they are also well enforced. The EU does 
not coerce candidates into meeting the requirements. Indeed, some EU member 
states would be indifferent to, if not pleased by, the defection of some or all of 
the candidates from the accession process – a fact that makes the conditionality 
of accession all the more powerful (as long as the process itself is not put in 
question).27 But if states insist on pursuing membership, they are voluntarily 
subjecting their domestic policy process to the examination and evaluation of 
the EU. The member states task the European Commission to monitor the 
adoption and implementation of policies as diverse as those to reform the public 
administration, safeguard the independence of the central bank, modernize the 
judiciary, improve the environment, harmonize transport policy, reinforce 
borders, bolster civil society and fight racism.28 
                                                 
25 The double standard on the provision of ethnic minority rights was also ameliorated 
somewhat by the Amsterdam treaty: Article 13 calls on the EU to combat discrimination 
based on racial and ethnic origin. De Witte 2000, 19-20. 
26 See Vachudova 2001(b). 
27 For the argument that the EU has become a reluctantly expanding regional core at the 
demand of its periphery, Kupchan 1998. 
28 Whether candidates are meeting their commitments to the human rights and international 
financial institutions has become an important component of the Commission’s overall 
evaluation of economic and political reform. Since 1997, the Commission has adopted the 
evaluations and prescriptions of the OSCE and the Council of Europe with little modification. 
To a lesser extent, this has also become true of the World Bank and the IMF. In this way, the 
12 RSC 2001/33 © 2001 Milada Anna Vachudova Earlier applicants for EU membership had less to do: They already had 
functioning market economies, and the acquis was far less substantial, especially 
before the completion of the internal market. East European applicants have to 
rebuild completely the economy and the state administration, while attempting 
to adopt the whole of the acquis, which is itself growing day by day. Their 
economic backwardness gives the EU a powerful reason to delay accession until 
requirements are met, because as members they will become a substantial drain 
on the EU budget while sending workers and exports westward. And while the 
geopolitical context of the Cold War militated against setting rigorous 
membership requirements for prospective EU members, the geopolitical context 
of post-Cold War Europe – with fears of ethnic conflict realized by wars in the 
Balkans and with a potentially overwhelming EU membership queue of 18 or 
more candidates – gives EU leaders another powerful reason to insist that 
requirements be met. 
 
2. DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL INCENTIVES 
 
Having considered the sources of EU leverage, we now turn to how the 
incentives and the requirements of EU membership were treated by the ruling 
elites of six credible future EU member states – Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania – over the course of the 1990s. Since 
the EU offered the important economic and security benefits sketched above, all 
six held full membership as a prominent foreign policy goal throughout the 
decade. But by the time the EU and NATO extended invitations to begin 
negotiations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1997, it had become 
clear that these three states were far closer to meeting the domestic requirements 
of EU membership than Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Why were the 
incentives of EU membership measured differently in different East European 
capitals? Can we explain this variation without considering the course of 
domestic political change in each country after 1989? Let us consider briefly 
three alternative explanations: a state’s position in the international system, 
geography, and economic prosperity. 
 
Realists treat regional integration as a way for hegemonic states to impose 
cooperation on weaker states.29 Realists may therefore consider that the EU is 
asserting its economic and political might, taking advantage of the feebleness of 
postcommunist states in order to impose rules and regulations and dominate 
domestic politics against the will of local elites too weak to protect their 
sovereignty. But the EU does not impose cooperation on the candidates: many 
EU member states are indifferent to enlargement, and some are openly opposed 
                                                                                                                                                          
EU accession process has boosted the leverage of all four institutions. See Kelley 2001, 10-
11; and also Checkel 2000. 
29 Mearsheimer 1990; Hurrell 1995. 
13 RSC 2001/33 © 2001 Milada Anna Vachudova to the accession of any postcommunist state in the next decade. If the EU was 
coercing the cooperation and adaptation of postcommunist states we would 
moreover expect to see the weakest states succumbing to this coercion more 
readily than the strongest. Instead, some of the politically and economically 
stronger states have made the most progress in satisfying accession requirements 
and unilaterally adapting 80,000 pages of EU norms and standards. Realists also 
treat regional integration as an alliance created to counter the rising power of a 
threatening state.30 But on this logic we would expect to see all East European 
states doing their utmost to join the EU and NATO to counter the threat of a 
resurgent Russia.31 
 
A second competing explanation is geography: The success of reform 
aimed at entering the EU has been explained as a function of a postcommunist 
country’s geographical distance from the EU’s border. This can be dismissed 
because of Slovakia’s (as well as Croatia’s) proximity to the EU. Nevertheless, 
there is clearly a strong correlation between geography and liberal democracy. 
Jeffrey Kopstein and David Reilly provide a more subtle analysis where the 
strict geographic proximity of a postcommunist state to the West is combined 
with openness to create a new measure called “accessibility.” They find that 
“states that are near the West but have established barriers to interaction are less 
likely to be influenced by Western ideals and practices than a state that is near 
and receptive.”32 But this raises similar questions to those posed by this article: 
what domestic factors determine the level of “openness” to outside influences? 
 
A third competing explanation is economic prosperity: Many observers of 
the EU accession process consider that the relative progress of postcommunist 
candidates toward EU membership is a function of their economic starting point 
at the moment of democratization in 1989. Since all six states confront similar 
strategic environments and economic incentives, systemic theories of 
international relations, be they realist or institutionalist, might also predict that 
all six states endeavor with equal commitment – but varying ability – to join the 
EU. On this logic, the variation in responses to the incentives of EU membership 
can be explained by relative levels of per capita income, because these 
determine a state’s ability to meet the EU’s accession requirements. 
                                                 
30 A realist theory of foreign policy might predict that all six states "bandwagon" with the EU 
hegemon and/or "balance" against threats from the East: Walt 1987; Christensen and Snyder 
1991, 138; and Rose 1998. 
31 Walt allows that under unusual conditions two domestic variables – ideological orientation 
and the domestic costs of compliance with a patron – may affect bandwagoning decisions. 
But this raises the questions that this article seeks to answer: what determines the ideological 
orientation of governing elites, and how do they evaluate the costs and benefits of 
accommodating themselves to alternative patrons? Walt 1987, 39, 45. 
32 Kopstein and Reilly 2000, 17. See also Whitehead 1999. 
14 RSC 2001/33 © 2001 Milada Anna Vachudova The evidence, however, does not bear this out: per capita income in 1989 
does not correlate with progress toward EU membership in the subsequent five 
years. The most prosperous states did not make the greatest progress toward 
meeting EU requirements. Poland’s per capita income was lower than that of 
Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic (a part of Czechoslovakia) in 1989.   
Moreover, economic ability did not bear on the strictly political requirements for 
EU membership that were the cornerstone of EU conditionality in the mid-
1990s. Meeting at least these political requirements could have brought 
substantial economic rewards which all of the less prosperous countries ought to 
have been most keen to receive. 
 
It is more compelling to define modernization broadly, and to argue that 
the progress of industrialization and urbanization in the 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries determine a country’s “transition scorecard” after the collapse of 
communism. This scorecard would include such measures as the skill level of 
the population, the development of infrastructure, and the capability of the 
public administration, but need not be reflected in per capita income in 1989.  
This would help account for Poland’s success despite its impoverished economy 
in 1989.  More interesting, it could be used to build a theory of why strong 
oppositions to communism developed in some states but not in others. However, 
rich Czechoslovakia as well as rich Yugoslavia would be the outliers: while they 
spawned liberal pattern states (the Czech Republic and Slovenia), they also 
spawned nationalist pattern ones (Slovakia and Croatia) where little or no 
opposition to communism existed before 1989. In both cases, as discussed 
below, politics trumped economics as a political vacuum allowed questions of 
nation – the struggle for independence and the presence of a large ethnic 
minority – to shape domestic political change. 
 
Two Types of Political Change in Eastern Europe 
 
The answer to the puzzle of why we see so much variation in the responses of 
governments to the incentives of EU membership is best found on the stage of 
domestic politics. The cost to governing elites of fulfilling the EU’s domestic 
requirements varies after 1989 according to their dependence on ethnic 
nationalism and economic corruption to win and keep political power. What I 
call a liberal and a nationalist pattern of political change are discernible among 
the states of Eastern Europe after 1989, and the essential feature dividing them is 
how governing elites represent the interests of society in their execution of 
political and economic reform. Whether the regime change brings to power 
individuals and groups that previously formed a strong opposition to 
communism is decisive.  
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and set the terms of political debate; they pursue relatively successful 
marketizing reforms and marginalize extreme nationalists and communists. In 
the nationalist pattern, no strong group of former oppositionists exists to take 
power after 1989: Nationalists, usually unreformed communists, win power in 
democratic elections by appealing to the fear of economic reform and the 
mistrust of ethnic minorities. Once in power, they harness domestic institutions 
to corrupt marketizing reforms and scapegoat ethnic minorities. The 
concentration of power in the hands of these elites, unchecked by other political 
forces, allows them to mislead electorates about the long-term costs of ethnic 
nationalism and of halting economic reform.33 
  
The study of how domestic factors influence the behavior of states in the 
international arena has centered on three debates. The first, democratic peace 
theory, focuses on regime type, seeking to explain why liberal democracies do 
not go to war with one another.34 The second, “realist” theory that relies on 
variations in domestic preferences, exposes the activities of elites or interest 
groups who have taken control of the levers of state power and conduct self-
serving foreign policies at the expense of society.35 The third, centered on the 
field of international political economy, explains how domestic institutions resist 
and adapt to changes in the international economy by exploring the relationship 
between of society and the state.36 
  
A liberal theory of international relations, as woven together by Andrew 
Moravcsik from liberalism’s different strands, offers an overarching theory 
about how the representation of societal interests by governing elites shapes the 
foreign ambitions of the state. The core liberal argument is that the greater the 
mutual gains from social cooperation, the greater the incentives for political 
accommodation; but the greater the concentrations of political, economic or 
social power, the greater the temptation for concentrated groups to provoke 
conflict in order to accumulate rents at the expense of others in society: “Where 
power asymmetries permit groups to evade the costs of redistributing goods, 
incentives arise for exploitative, rent-seeking behavior, even if the result is 
inefficient for society as a whole.”37 
 
                                                 
33 Vachudova and Snyder 1997. For a similar argument emphasizing the importance 
of rapid electoral replacement of the communist elites in 1990 over 26 postcommunist 
cases, Fish 1998. On comparing transition, King 2000. 
34 Doyle 1986; Russett 1993; and Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller 1996. 
35 Van Evera 1990; Van Evera 1999; Walt 1992; and Snyder 1991. See also Legro and 
Moravcsik 1999; and Rose 1998, 149-50. 
36 Gourevitch 1978; Katzenstein 1985; and Evangelista 1997. 
37 Moravcsik 1997, 517. 
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of society, and if we accept that state capture in a democratizing state depends 
on whether former oppositionists succeed communists in power in 1989, then 
my six case studies support liberal theory in the following way. The Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland have more representative governments after 
1989; consequently, their respective foreign policies reflect societal interest in 
increased international cooperation. In Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, 
however, power is concentrated in the hands of communist elites who distort and 
suppress individual preferences by using ethnic nationalism and economic 
corruption. Consequently, the governments' de facto foreign policy (defined 
because of EU membership requirements as including domestic policy) 
contravenes societal interest and results in decreased international cooperation. 
  
The three strands of liberal theory discussed below – Republican, 
Commercial and Ideational Liberalism – suggest three variables that determine 
the level of international conflict or cooperation sought by governing elites: (1) 
the representativeness of domestic institutions, (2) the extent of transnational 
economic interaction, and (3) the level of social equality and cohesion.38 For 
Eastern Europe’s democratizing states, the three variables are congruent with the 
three factors that mark the success or failure of liberal democracy after 1989: (1) 
the presence or absence of a strong opposition to communism; (2) the quality of 
marketizing reforms; and (3) the use of ethnically divisive political strategies.  
  
The aim here is to describe the state of the polity in 1989: these three 
variables subsume and simplify many historical and institutional factors that are 
beyond the scope of this article. The presence or absence of a strong opposition 
to communism speaks to whether the state had a usable democratic past, how 
dissent was treated by the regime and how the communist party developed 
internally over previous decades.39 The success or failure of a political strategy 
of delaying and contorting economic reform hinges partially on the population’s 
attitudes toward market capitalism and by the fitness and structure of the 
economy inherited from communism. Likewise, the susceptibility of the 
electorate to strategies of ethnic scapegoating depends on the use of nationalism 
by the communist regime and by the history of the nation’s interactions with 
neighboring ethnic groups.40 Still, comparing postcommunist states through 
these three strands of liberalism helps uncover what causes ruling elites to 
respond differently to the EU’s membership incentives after 1989.  
 
Presence or Absence of Opposition to Communism Determines State 
Capture 
                                                 
38 Moravcsik 1997, 516-521. 
39 See Ekiert 1996, 305-330. 
40 Kolakowski 1992, 52. 
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Republican liberalism predicts that “when political representation is biased in 
favor of particularistic groups, they tend to “capture” government institutions 
and employ them for their ends alone, systematically passing on the costs and 
risks to others.”41 In postcommunist states, the presence or absence of a strong 
opposition to communism determines the extent of state capture. Revolution had 
to precede democracy, and the character of the elites on hand for revolution 
determined in large measure who would be elected to the first government and 
whether that government would attempt comprehensive political and economic 
reform.  
 
  In Poland, Hungary and the Czech lands, the elites who came to power in 
1989-90 derived their legitimacy from their support of the norms of liberal 
democracy.42 The Western model was so deeply internalized as to become a 
truly domestic factor.   In all three states, the two most compelling political 
platforms of postcommunism – the protection of the average voter from 
economic reform and the defense of the nation from its "enemies" – were 
usually handled in a way which was consistent with marketizing reforms and 
liberal democracy.43 The post-opposition governing elites set the parameters of 
mainstream political debate, dislodging the communists and marginalizing 
extreme nationalists. The appeals of nationalists, meanwhile, were muted by the 
absence of a large, cohesive ethnic minority.  
 
On crucial issues such as national reconciliation and economic reform, 
former oppositionists exploited the revolutionary moment to begin policies far 
more "European" than their societies had expected. They faced the challenge of 
decisively representing the future interests of society.44 T h e  m o r e  o r  l e s s  
immediate embrace of liberal democracy promoted decisionmaking that was in 
the public interest, and helped prevent decisionmaking that would cripple the 
polity over the long term. 45 For example, knowing it would consequently lose 
                                                 
41 Moravcsik 1997, 530. 
42 I do not contend that these former oppositionists had a perfect knowledge of their societies' 
interests and preferences when they came to power. But they were able to persuade their 
societies that the national future was in a liberal democratic Europe, and create a consensus 
about reform and foreign policy which, in the Hungarian and Polish cases, was only 
strengthened by electoral defeat to reformed former communists. See Moravcsik 1997, 531; 
and Keohane and Milner 1996, 252-53. 
43 Holmes 1995, 267-274. 
44 As Claus Offe explained, "reforming elites, by taking responsibility for and helping to start 
a capitalist economic mechanism represent the interests of society, without, however, being 
able in the process to rely upon and comply with the demands of an already existing class of 
capitalist owners and their interests, power, and ideological propositions." Offe 1991, 877. 
See also Jacoby 1999, 471; Rose 2001 and Bozoki 1999. 
45 Polish society did not resist the radical reform measures which were closely associated with 
the democratic revolution. On Polish resistance to economic reform at the hands of previous 
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reform program which led to a sharp drop in living standards but eventually 
propelled Poland into the economic vanguard of Eastern Europe.  
  
While post-opposition governing elites convinced electorates to accept 
difficult economic reform as part of the democratic revolution, social democrats 
(reformed communists, as in Poland and Hungary, or a historical party, as in the 
Czech Republic) provided voters disaffected with reform with a non-nationalist 
and pro-EU left-wing alternative. The election of former communist parties in 
Poland (1993) and Hungary (1994) – parties that continued or even intensified 
comprehensive economic reform – only reinforced the liberal equation. Now 
social democratic, these parties had been forced to reform themselves by the 
weight of opposition before 1989 and by the need to compete with strong post-
opposition parties since 1989. Moreover, these parties campaigned as the less 
nationalistic, pro-reform alternative to post-opposition parties on the right. 
Indeed, the presence of a liberalizing communist party before 1989 and its 
subsequent victory as a Western-oriented, social democratic party in elections 
after 1989 is the best recipe for a successful transition in postcommunist Europe. 
  
The absence of a strong opposition to communism created a political 
vacuum in 1989, which allowed unreformed communists (in Romania and 
Bulgaria) and nationalist opportunists (in Slovakia) to win power by using 
ethnic nationalism and fear of economic reform to forge a new political identity 
and maintain their political viability.46 Despite their democratic, pro-Western 
rhetoric, they undermined democracy, sabotaged economic reform and fostered 
intolerance in their efforts to concentrate and prolong their power.47 The 
domestic requirements of EU membership proscribed the very mechanisms by 
which they consolidated political power: ethnic nationalism and economic 
corruption.48 
  Democratic participation, especially in conditions of democratization, is 
itself no guarantee of unbiased representation. "Even where government 
                                                                                                                                                          
(communist) governments, Evangelista 1997, 212-217. On a government’s decision to 
implement institutional change that will be costly in the short run, Garrett and Lange 1995; 
and Haggard and Webb 1994. 
46 Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 31; Linz and Stepan 1996, 254. See also Kitchelt 1992. 
47 The Romanian communist party renamed itself the Party of Social Democracy in Romania 
(PSDR), while the Bulgarian communist party renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP). Unlike those in Romania and Bulgaria, the Slovak communist party moved toward 
genuine social democracy. However, it was sidelined by Vladmir Meciar’s Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) which built its political support by way of ethnic nationalism 
and fear of economic reform. 
48 Ethnic nationalism and economic corruption were used in the three states in different 
measures. For example, to consolidate power Bulgaria’s BSP employed corruption and fear of 
economic reform; its use of ethnic scapegoating was much more muted than that of 
Romania’s PSDR or Slovakia’s HZDS. 
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property, risk, information or organizational capabilities may create social or 
economic monopolies able to dominate policy."49 Where the communists were 
never forced from power, they naturally had few difficulties in capitalizing on 
social and economic assets retained from the ancien regime, most importantly 
control of the state-run television. Political change in Croatia and Serbia 
followed the same pattern, but in both cases ethnic nationalism was exacerbated 
by the uncoordinated break-up of a multi-ethnic state, by ethnic cleansing and 
by warfare. 
 
Political elites governing Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania articulated 
foreign policies that called for rapprochement to the EU and NATO. The 
interests of society and the state were sacrificed, however, in the economically 
corrupt and nationalist domestic strategies they adopted in order to hold power 
in the period of democratization. By promoting ethnic nationalism and 
corrupting economic reform, they diminished wealth and security by 
compromising their state’s application for EU membership and curtailing 
relations with foreign economic actors. The prospect of EU membership in fact 
multiplies the international effects of domestic policy choices, making the 
opportunity costs of “illiberal” politics at home unusually high. Absent this 
prospect, a government propped up by ethnic nationalism would at most compel 
the suspension of some international aid and the withdrawal of some foreign 
investment – as long as it resisted foreign military adventures. In postcommunist 
Europe, a government legitimized by ethnic nationalism makes society pay the 
high price of forsaking EU membership. 
  
Commercial Ties Shape Demand for International Cooperation 
 
A comparison of the two groups of states confirms the link made by commercial 
liberalism between complex international commercial ties and the demand for 
international cooperation. All of the liberal pattern states reoriented their trade as 
rapidly as possible from East to West. They became much more dependent on 
the West for trade and received much more foreign investment than the 
nationalist pattern states. As a result, they were more concerned with EU 
membership for reasons of market access. Economic progress within a private 
economy increased the material stake of individuals and groups in trade with 
Western Europe, thereby reducing their willingness to upset relations with the 
EU and to scare off foreign investors by supporting nationalistic politicians.50 
                                                 
49 Moravcsik 1997, 518. 
50 The Czech Republic stands as a partial exception: the voucher privatization program 
launched by the government of Václav Klaus in 1992 was designed to keep enterprise shares 
in the hands of Czech citizens. This nationalist agenda spelled disaster: participating Czech 
enterprises received no injection of capital, while the weakness of the rule of law and of 
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actors for marketizing reform, while also “pluralizing” communist-era 
distributions of income and power.51 
 
In the nationalist pattern states, governing elites promised the electorate 
slow economic reform, as a way to prevent widespread unemployment. Rather 
than improving aggregate economic welfare, slow reform protected and enriched 
communist-era managers, whose inefficient firms should have been restructured 
or forced into bankruptcy. Often, money poured from the state budget through 
these enterprises straight into the managers’ pockets. Privatization also become 
remarkably corrupt, with governing elites handing out state property to 
economic cronies for a fraction of its actual worth. For these intertwined circles 
of political and economic elites, comprehensive and transparent economic 
reforms, as demanded by the EU accession process, proved much too costly: 
why forego the ongoing benefits from partial reform? As Joel Hellman explains, 
“winners from an earlier stage of reform have incentives to block further 
advances in reform that would correct the very distortions on which their initial 
gains were based. In effect, they seek to prolong the period of partial reforms to 
preserve their initial flow of rents, though at a considerable social cost.”52 
  
At the same time as reform was stalled, corruption suppressed the interest 
groups which would normally develop in a functioning market economy with 
strong links to the global economy. Also, the political device of raising fears of 
economic reform obscured from the electorate the rising opportunity costs of 
blocking institutional change. For Romania and Bulgaria, which in 1989 had 
(along with Poland) the most impoverished economies of the region, halting 
reforms brought great hardship without accomplishing the transition to the 
market. For Slovakia, the corruption of reform brought recession and drove 
foreign investors away from an economy that had otherwise shown considerable 
promise. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
corporate governance invited Czech mangers to strip the assets of many enterprises in an 
operation dubbed “tunneling.” Vachudova 2001(a).  
51 Doyle 1997, 476. 
52 Hellman 1998, 233. See also Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 374. 
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Ethnic nationalism provides another, more powerful tool for the capture of 
domestic institutions by rent-seeking elites in a democratizing state. Ethnic 
nationalism warps the individual and group preferences that would develop in a 
liberal democracy by creating a stark division along ideational lines on all 
politically salient issues. Ideational liberalism is concerned with the level of 
social equality and cohesion: deep divisions in interest or identity can undermine 
the representativeness of domestic institutions. In particular, the existence of 
ethnic minorities may create fundamental conflicts of interest within (and 
among) states.53  
 
  Ethnic geography – a matter of historically conditioned perceptions rather 
than ‘pure’ demography – determines the salience of ethnic nationalism as a 
political strategy. While Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are relatively 
homogenous, in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania one cohesive ethnic minority 
forms about ten percent of the population. There are some 600,000 ethnic 
Hungarians in Slovakia (11% of the total population), 2 million ethnic 
Hungarians in Romania (8%), and 800,000 ethnic Turks in Bulgaria (10%). The 
success of Slovak, Bulgarian and Romanian postcommunists in exploiting 
feelings of threat on the part of the national majority can be attributed to three 
facts: minorities form a significant portion of the population; history lends 
credibility to assertions that the minority harbors a separatist agenda; and 
minorities have formed cohesive political organizations. Moreover, the political 
activism of ethnic Hungarian minority groups combined with the forceful 
advocacy of the Hungarian government provided “external validity” to the 
accusations of the Romanian and Slovak governments that Hungarian minorities 
posed a threat to the nation.54 Ethnic nationalism came to permeate domestic 
politics in all three states, and the basic rights of ethnic minorities were 
endangered and, at times, seriously curtailed.   
 
  Liberal theory implies that private individuals and groups calculate the 
opportunity costs and benefits, material and non-material, of alternative 
domestic policies in terms of foreign policy goals. Ethnic nationalism helped 
win elections in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania (and elsewhere in 
postcommunist Europe) because voters did not understand that ethnic 
nationalism at home delays or prevents substantial gains in wealth and security 
by the special means of EU membership.55 Governing elites in nationalist pattern 
                                                 
53 Moravcsik 1997, 525-26. 
54 See Bates, de Figueiredo and Weingast, 246. 
55 Opinion polls in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania showed that an important segment of 
voters strongly supported membership in the EU while voting for opportunistic nationalists. 
These polls also showed that voters had a very feeble understanding of the criteria of EU 
membership, and that ruling elites were able to manipulate this understanding through their 
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identification of the state with the ethnos. In so doing, they sacrificed the long-
term interests of the state in European integration to the pursuit of their own 
political power. As discussed below, however, EU membership remained 
popular and democratic oppositions used the imperative of reversing their 
country’s poor standing in the eyes of the EU as a cornerstone of their electoral 
campaigns. 
 
3. THE PASSIVE AND ACTIVE LEVERAGE OF THE EU 
 
1989-1994: Domestic Factors Only Shape Democratization 
 
I have argued that the character of political change in East European states 
immediately after 1989 depended on domestic factors, primarily on the quality 
of the opposition to communism. During this period (1989-1994), international 
factors played a marginal role in the composition and the policy choices of the 
first post-communist governments. However, the strategies adopted by these 
first governments in response to international incentives – to the “passive 
leverage” of the EU – distinguished liberal and nationalist pattern states from 
one another well before the EU had even committed itself to enlargement.  
 
  By the force of the attraction of its markets and institutions, the EU 
exercised “passive leverage” on the domestic policy choices of the governments 
of democratizing states of Eastern Europe after 1989. The EU provided not only 
a goal for foreign policy, but its prevailing rules and practices provided clues as 
to the domestic policies necessary to achieve this goal.56 In this sense the EU 
supplied "normative targets" for East European states well before it had set out 
any membership requirements or even agreed to an expansion. These targets 
gave political leaders a reason to push through difficult economic reforms, and 
gave electorates a reason to accept the attendant sacrifices, usually in the form of 
economic hardship. The long-term goal of EU membership "constrained state 
behavior primarily by creating a normative focal point for domestic adjustment 
efforts, often in advance of participation in existing organizations or western 
demands."57  
 
  The EU exerted this “passive leverage” primarily on liberal pattern 
governments. Although governing elites in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Hungary desired more explicit and active guidance from Brussels, 
the EU needed to do little – except hold out the credible promise of membership 
– to inspire these states to make policy choices consistent with future 
                                                                                                                                                          
control of the mainstream media, especially of state-run television. See for example the 
findings in the report “Public Awareness Campaign,” GFK Slovakia, April-July 1998.  
56 Snyder 2001. 
57 Haggard, Levy, Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1993, 185. 
23 RSC 2001/33 © 2001 Milada Anna Vachudova membership. Nationalist pattern governments kept up a rhetoric of working to 
join the EU, but only adjusted to those implicit norms which suited them. A 
certain level of Western acceptance strengthened their domestic credentials as 
reformers, while Western loans and trade agreements provided much-needed 
economic resources. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that it is 
counterproductive for international actors to provide resources to governments 
disposed against reform as they “postpone, rather than pursue, adjustment.”58 
 
Since the future requirements of membership were not specified and 
surveillance of domestic politics was only sporadic from 1989 to 1994, 
governing elites in nationalist pattern states demanded EU membership while 
pursuing rent-seeking domestic strategies with impunity. One litmus test of the 
sincerity of a government’s EU strategy was whether or not they pressed for 
specific accession criteria: Liberal pattern governments pleaded for a list of 
conditions, while nationalist pattern governments complained already of 
unwarranted attention to internal affairs. The EU’s passive leverage was not 
self-sustaining – even in liberal pattern states. The continued denial of even a 
commitment in principle to expansion discredited moderate, pro-reform parties 
because of their commitment to "Europe." For this reason the EU's passive 
leverage declined over time, and an EU that had remained passive could have 
become dangerous to democratization. 
  
  When the EU did commit itself to an eastern enlargement at the 
Copenhagen summit in June 1993, it began the process of developing the tools 
to interact purposefully with the eastern candidates.  It finally set out the general 
political and economic conditions of membership in the so-called Copenhagen 
criteria, but it did not evaluate the candidates in terms of these requirements. For 
the nationalist pattern governments, the only ramification of manifestly failing 
to the meet the Copenhagen criteria – even in the prominent area of ethnic 
minority rights – was the threat of exclusion from a first wave of EU expansion. 
Such an exclusion seemed very distant in 1993 – and indeed it would take the 
EU four more years to separate the “ins” from the “outs.” For the liberal pattern 
governments, the Copenhagen requirements were too general to have much of 
an impact. By any account, they were making progress toward them in the mid-
1990s. The general expectations of the EU in many areas coincided with the 
political and economic agenda of the liberal pattern governments. When they did 
not, as in reform of the state administration or privatization, this remained 
largely hidden for want of a systematic, first-hand evaluation by any external 
actor.  
 
                                                 
58 Haggard and Webb 1994, 27. 
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International factors, especially the incentives of EU membership, began to have 
a fundamental impact on domestic politics in the mid-1990s by making rent-
seeking strategies less tenable. During this period (1995-1999), the character of 
the elites who won power in postcommunist states no longer depended on 
domestic factors. In this section I argue that international factors influenced 
domestic political outcomes in nationalist pattern states chiefly by changing the 
behavior of the electorate and the opposition, not the government. “Active 
leverage” eventually helped remove nationalist pattern governments from office 
by tarnishing them in the eyes of the electorate, and by providing the opposition 
with a convincing electoral platform.  
 
  In nationalist pattern states in the early 1990s, the West confronted the 
mistreatment of ethnic minorities, the contravention of democratic standards, 
and the unsteadiness of progress towards a market economy as well as tense 
relations between neighboring states. As war ravaged Bosnia, a Western 
consensus developed about the dangers and costs of ethnic politics and anti-
democratic practices in other postcommunist states. Ethnic scapegoating got the 
EU’s attention because it inflicted costs on dominant groups in other countries, 
foremost on Hungary, a vocal protector state.59 But the EU's passive leverage on 
nationalist pattern states was significantly weaker than on liberal pattern states, 
as governing elites calculated that meeting explicit and implicit standards of 
domestic policy would require sacrifices that would risk their political futures.60 
The oft-heard call to defend the nation's sovereignty signaled the boundary 
between Western endorsements – to be solicited – and Western demands on 
ethnic minority rights and economic reform – to be opposed.  
 
  Active leverage – the deliberate attempt to influence domestic politics – 
was applied in two ways. First, the EU and other international institutions tried 
through diplomatic channels to pressure governments to change particular 
policies, especially to improve the provision of ethnic minority rights. But this 
pressure was largely unsuccessful in the nationalist pattern states.61 Second, the 
                                                 
59 Moravcsik 1997, 520-21. 
60 On the rationality of ethnic politics, Offe 1997, 60-61. 
61 The liberal pattern states, in contrast, did react to Western criticism of their treatment of the 
Roma, and Hungary changed tack due to Western censure of its aggressive advocacy of the 
rights of ethnic Hungarians abroad. For the first postcommunist government of Hungary, led 
by Prime Minister Jozef Antall, the goal of improving the situation of ethnic Hungarian 
minorities in neighboring states clashed at times with its goal of attaining rapid EU and 
NATO membership. This was chiefly because it worried the West by refusing to normalize 
relations with Slovakia and Romania until the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in those 
states improved. The West's pressure came to bear on Hungary particularly when it sought to 
veto Slovakia's admittance to the Council of Europe: the West Europeans and Americans 
strongly preferred inclusion (and there ended the Council's leverage on Slovakia). Author’s 
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linked its judgments to a state’s eligibility for EU membership. Even when the 
threat of exclusion made the costs of not complying with the Copenhagen 
criteria clear, Western pressure to change particular policies had surprisingly 
little effect on nationalist pattern states except at moments when there were clear 
and immediate pay-offs to cooperation: when a state’s eligibility for the Council 
of Europe was being evaluated, or when a loan from the IMF or the World Bank 
was at stake. Even then, ruling elites changed their domestic policies only in 
superficial, short-term ways.   
 
  Of greatest concern to Western actors were governments whose use of 
nationalism threatened the rights of ethnic minorities and peaceful relations with 
neighboring states. One of the first examples of the use of active leverage, the 
Balladur Plan of 1993, was designed to use the carrot of future EU membership 
to encourage East European states to settle national disputes: to pledge their 
acceptance of existing boundaries and their protection of the rights of national 
minorities. The prospect of a March 1995 conference did cause Hungary and 
Slovakia to sign a long-delayed treaty on good relations in which the Slovak 
government agreed to ambitious provisions for the protection of minority rights. 
It also caused Hungary and Romania to make advances in their troubled 
negotiation of a similar treaty.62 But the Balladur Plan exhibited the 
powerlessness of the EU to sway nationalist pattern governments with the threat 
of exclusion from a distant first wave of EU expansion. The nationalist 
governments of Slovakia and Romania, though they signed exemplary treaties 
with Hungary abroad, failed to abide by their provisions at home.63 
 
  A tool of active leverage which the EU resorted to only in the case of 
Slovakia was the démarche. Slovakia merited special attention because it sits on 
the EU’s borders, and because its nationalist government outlived those in 
Romania and Bulgaria. EU démarches in 1995, 1996 and 1997 served as a signal 
to the electorates and to economic elites that government policies were risking 
Slovakia's place in the EU membership queue. The démarches were 
unsuccessful in compelling the Meciar government to end chauvinist and corrupt 
practices. However, they did frighten it away from a few anti-democratic 
                                                                                                                                                          
interviews with Geza Jeszenszky, Foreign Minister of Hungary 1990-1994, Budapest, June 
1998; and Rudolf Joo, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1998. 
62 The Balladur Plan was greeted with little interest by the Polish and Czech governments, 
who saw the pact as an attempt to tar them with the brush of ethnic conflicts to their east and 
south. Poland had by this time signed treaties of good relations with all seven of its neighbors, 
while the Czech Republic had no minority problems likely to strain relations with its 
neighbors. 
63 For the argument that repressive governments move from denial to tactical concessions 
before either changing policy or losing power in the face of domestic and international 
pressure, see Risse 1999. 
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parliament. As the démarches sent to Slovakia became increasingly specific, it 
became more difficult for the Meciar government to recast them as general 
approbation or to reject them as blanket condemnation of Slovakia. The 
increased institutional capacity of the Commission to follow domestic politics in 
applicant states enabled it to provide detailed criticisms of the Meciar 
government’s policies, which meant that they packed more of a domestic 
political punch. Moreover, as the enlargement project became more concrete, the 
governments of member states – who must approve a démarche – became more 
willing to take a decisive stand on issues of domestic politics.64 
 
  The limit of the EU’s political will to exercise a more deliberate or 
“active” leverage was demonstrated by the failure to suspend Europe 
Agreements with any nationalist pattern states. Such a suspension, which would 
have amounted to a serious economic sanction, was never considered – even 
though the Europe Agreements included provisions stipulating that democracy 
and ethnic minority rights must be upheld in order for the Agreement to be 
valid.65 In 1995 and 1996, the suspension of the Europe Agreement with 
Slovakia might have proved a particularly effective sanction: Slovak ruling 
elites relied heavily on revenues from enterprises whose exports were enabled 
by the Agreement. EU officials explained publicly that the Europe Agreements 
were viewed as the groundwork for integrating – not isolating – eastern 
candidates. More important, Western producers would have suffered losses from 
the suspension of free trade with Slovakia.66 The economic character of the 
Europe Agreements – and of the EU itself – was underscored by the fact that 
throughout the 1990s the EU promptly and decisively sanctioned the violation of 
their trade provisions, but never their political provisions. 
 
Oppositions and Electorates Influenced by the Prospect of EU Membership 
 
Once the EU began to judge the quality of reform in aspiring member states and 
link its assessments publicly to a state’s prospect for EU membership, it 
influenced the outcome of elections by helping to change the preferences of 
domestic actors. It undermined the political strategies of ethnic nationalism and 
economic corruption by revealing their costs and providing compelling 
alternatives to political and economic elites. Electorates were overwhelmingly in 
                                                 
64 Author’s interviews with Eduard Kukan, Chairman of the Democratic Union and (future) 
Foreign Minister of Slovakia, Bratislava, July 1998; Michael Rupp, European Commission, 
Brussels, July 1998; Petr Javorcik, Slovak Delegation to the European Union, Brussels, 
November 1998; and Miroslav Wlachowsky, Director of Policy Planning, Slovak Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, July 1999. 
65 Author’s interviews with officials of DGIA, European Commission, Brussels, July 1998 
and May 1999. 
66 On the impact of international capture on economic sanctions, Mansfield 1994, 134-37. 
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the EU, which they considered the only path to increased economic prosperity. 
The EU’s vocal criticisms – echoed by a growing number of local civil society 
groups and opposition parties – gradually taught a segment of the voters that 
nationalist pattern governments were not, despite their claims, leading their 
countries into the EU. This invites further research on how the rush to join 
Europe – linked as it is with the quality of government and the course of 
economic reform – has impacted voting patterns in postcommunist states. 
 
  Oppositions in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria used clear signals from 
the EU and NATO – along with Western money and advice – to position 
themselves as credible challengers to the hegemony of postcommunist 
nationalists. The most successful electoral platform included attacking the ruling 
elites for forsaking the country’s prospects of a “return to Europe.” Parties of the 
center-right and center-left had been neither strong nor unified in these countries 
after 1989, nor had they necessarily been “moderate” or “liberal.” Western 
representatives of international institutions and non-governmental organizations 
were on hand to coach opposition politicians and local civil society leaders on 
the substance of a liberal democratic agenda.67 Over the course of the 1990s, 
many opposition politicians shifted substantially their position on ethnic 
minority rights and on economic reform to make their parties fit the increasingly 
attractive “pro-EU space” on the political spectrum.68  
 
  Meanwhile, economic elites also rallied behind an EU orientation as 
economic prosperity became increasingly linked to the West. Some had 
benefited from corrupt privatization, but now found it in their interest to break 
clientalistic ties to the ruling parties and to protect their ill-begotten gains 
through the rule of the law. Access to the EU market and other Western 
commercial opportunities could only be guaranteed by ending their country’s 
outcast status and putting it on track for EU membership (though these 
incentives would have been much stronger if the Europe Agreements had been 
suspended). In this manner, the economic interest groups in favor of 
international cooperation eventually became stronger in the nationalist pattern 
states. 
 
  Slovakia most clearly defied the argument that geography alone would 
predict the course of democratization, and that only states once removed from 
the EU’s borders would fall into the hands of nationalist politicians. Slovakia’s 
rent-seeking elites were the most extreme, in the sense that they sacrificed 
Slovakia’s inclusion in NATO and Slovakia’s place in the first group to begin 
negotiations with the EU. Both were virtually guaranteed to Slovakia given good 
                                                 
67 See Schmitter and Brouwer 1999. 
68 Author’s interviews with dozens of opposition politicians and civil society leaders in 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania in 1998 and 1999. 
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their governments after 1989 – was less certain because of geography and of 
economic backwardness. Slovak voters elected opportunistic nationalists in the 
crucial 1994 elections partly because Slovakia was a new state, where appeals to 
identity held particular sway and where an elite shortage created a substantial 
political vacuum. 
 
  That voters learn to identify the losses in economic welfare and state 
security incurred by the rule of nationalists, and that oppositions learn to 
organize themselves around a pro-EU political platform, helps account for the 
electoral victories of reformers in Romania in 1996, Bulgaria in 1997 and 
Slovakia in 1998. In the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, a severe deterioration 
of the economy is a competing explanation for the change in government. But 
the economic crisis was exacerbated if not caused by the same inefficiencies of 
corrupt economic reform and the same disregard for international constraints 
that retarded accession to the EU and NATO.69 
 
  On the pattern of Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, the electorate in 
Croatia ousted Franco Tudjman’s nationalist government in early 2000 and 
brought to power a broad coalition of Western-oriented parties that had run on a 
platform of earning EU membership as rapidly as possible.70 That ethnic 
nationalism failed to win elections after the “threatening” Serbian minority had 
been brutally expelled from Croatia was not remarkable. It will be noteworthy, 
however, if the incentives of joining the EU’s pre-accession process convince 
the Croats to encourage the Serbian minority to return. 
 
In the most deliberate instance of “active leverage” to date, the EU 
attempted in 1999 and 2000 to remove Slobodan Milosevic’s government from 
power in the FRY by spelling out that ethnic nationalists in power preclude 
prosperity by way of eventual EU membership. It also tried to raise esteem for 
the discredited and disunited opposition parties of Serbia by providing them 
with tangible economic support and international recognition in a high-profile 
                                                 
69 The economic crisis in Bulgaria in the winter of 1996-97 led to the fall of the BSP 
government and to early elections that brought reformers to government. In contrast, Romania 
did not experience a full scale economic crisis. The absence of crisis had two negative 
consequences: the unreformed former communists retained some credit, and the reformers 
were not forced to implement immediate and sweeping reforms. Similarly, economic crisis in 
Poland in 1989 and in Hungary in 1994 forced decisive economic reform and the absence of 
such a crisis in the Czech Republic allowed for dithering which proved costly in the long-run. 
That economic crisis may strengthen democracy is counter to the findings of Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997, 167-169, and points to the unique political condition of credible candidates for 
EU membership. 
70 Fisher 2001. Also author’s interviews with Goran Pitic, Economic Institute, Belgrade in 
Liechtenstein, June 1999; and Miljenko Dereta, Civic Initiatives, Belgrade in Bratislava, July 
1999. 
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elsewhere, the Milosevic government lost elections in late 2000 to a broad, pro-
reform coalition whose existence and political strategies are strongly 
conditioned by Western support. 
 
Globalization, Europeanization or Effective Conditionality? 
 
Was the EU’s active leverage really a key factor in the defeat of nationalist 
pattern governments to moderate oppositionists in elections in Romania, 
Bulgaria and Slovakia after 1995? One could argue instead that these countries 
sooner or later would elect political leaders that embarked on pro-Western 
reforms. They would do so because of the inescapable pressure of the world 
economy: globalization, not EU leverage, provides the impetus for reform. Or, 
they would do so because even in good economic conditions, let alone in bad 
ones, voters like to throw out the incumbent government. Thus the impact of 
short-term economic dissatisfaction on the electoral cycle, not the promise of 
long-term prosperity by way of EU membership, provides the trigger for 
electoral change. On these accounts, the EU is largely irrelevant. One could also 
argue that the rewards of EU membership (passive leverage) are so substantial 
that eventually all plausible candidates in the region come around to electing a 
pro-EU government and get to work on fulfilling the membership requirements. 
On this account, the EU’s deliberate policies (active leverage) are irrelevant. At 
most, they serve to speed the process up on the margins.  
 
If these competing explanations were accurate, we would not expect to see 
the opposition parties using rehabilitation in the eyes of the EU as such a prominent 
campaign slogan. The fact that they did prepared the electorate to expect the new 
government to get the country elevated to the next “stage” in the accession process 
(the opening of negotiations). This required implementing tough reforms that, in the 
short-run, only worsened the economic situation for the bulk of the electorate. Once 
elected, all three new, post-opposition governments treated EU accession 
requirements as an overriding priority and used them to justify reform. Meanwhile, 
if moderation of the opposition did not depend on the EU’s active leverage, we 
would expect to see effective mobilization around these issues in the early 1990s 
instead of only after 7-8 years of nationalist pattern rule. The benefits of 
membership were obvious enough, certainly to elites, as early as 1990. But back 
then, on their own account, the opposition forces were weak, divided and none too 
moderate. 
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The strategy of using conditionality to change the behavior of postcommunist 
neighbors can be considered a success, as by the close of the 1990s it had 
worked in many postcommunist states at little cost to EU member states.71 It 
even played a part in containing ethnic tensions, and thus helps us understand 
how sanctions can be used to address ethnic conflict. The underlying force 
remained the attractiveness of the EU as an organization, and the chief cost was 
a commitment regarding future benefits.72  
 
  After the exit of nationalist governments in nationalist pattern states, a 
significant challenge for the pre-accession process – and for expanding the 
liberal democratic core of Europe – is how to keep governments and publics 
committed to reform when the confluence of geography, economic 
backwardness, incompetence and years of counterproductive government means 
that EU accession is still a long way off. In Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia as well 
as in Croatia and Serbia, the election of “reformers” resembled in some ways the 
regime change of 1989 in liberal pattern states:  when newly elected, they 
benefited from similar, though weaker, political capital.73 
 
Moderate, Westernizing governments are faced with the unenviable 
political task of implementing the difficult economic reform and ethnic 
reconciliation that were purposefully thwarted by the previous government. EU 
requirements include economic reforms that lead to short-term economic 
hardship for the population; a domestic backlash may even take place if difficult 
reforms are tied very closely to international demands.74 Ethnic reconciliation is 
also divisive in countries where the population has been conditioned to feel 
threatened by the minority, and where domestic political discourse has been 
heavily ethnicized. Meanwhile, the rewards short of EU membership that would 
be the most effective in shoring up popular support for Westernizing 
                                                 
71 See Baldwin 1999, 80-107; and Schmitter and Brouwer 1999. 
72 Timothy Garton Ash and others have argued that the absence of a coherent EU foreign 
policy toward the former Yugoslavia proved very costly for EU member states: that the EU 
could have averted some or all of the violence and impoverishment of the Western Balkans by 
putting in place an ambitious, intrusive and attractive EU enlargement project right away in 
1990. Garton Ash 1999, 208-222, 316-331. 
73 Author’s interview with Steffan Skovmand, First Counselor, Delegation of the European 
Commission in Romania, Bucharest; Sergiu Celac, Foreign Minister of Romania 1989-1990, 
Bucharest; Antionette Primatarova, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Sofia; 
and Ognyan Minchev, Executive Director, Institute for Regional and International Studies, 
Sofia, November 1998. 
74 In most East European states, popular support for EU membership does decrease as 
domestic groups who may be disadvantaged by accession organize themselves and campaign 
against membership, and as governments substantiate difficult reforms with the task of 
qualifying for EU membership. 
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Yugoslavia are also the most difficult for the EU to deliver on account of the 
costs they will impose on the EU’s member states. These rewards include access 
to the EU market for agricultural goods and visa-free travel to the EU for Balkan 
citizens.75 Geography also plays a part as state’s along the EU’s borders 
naturally attract more foreign investment after the exit of nationalists. Moreover, 
while the EU’s membership requirements are uniformly applied, states along the 
EU’s borders seem to benefit from more attention and more enthusiasm as they 
prepare for accession. 
  
Does the election of reformers make nationalist pattern states into liberal 
pattern ones? Some political differences between the two groups are likely to be 
abiding ones. In liberal pattern states, it makes little difference which 
constellation of mainstream parties wins in national elections. However, in 
nationalist pattern states the cyclical exchange of governments makes it possible 
that nationalist parties, now in the opposition, will be returned to power.76 In 
what measure will they still rely on their previous political strategies of ethnic 
nationalism and economic corruption? Where this return to power takes place, it 
will provide a test for whether the changes in preferences brought about by pro-
Western economic policies and by participation in the EU’s pre-accession 
process are enduring. It will show how much ground the groups in society that 
benefit from opening to the West – from increased economic cooperation and 
improving prospects for EU membership – will have gained during government 
by reformers. Romania, where the old ruling nationalists returned to power in 
late 2000, will provide the first such test. 
 
The Merit of Meritocracy 
 
So far the EU has adopted a roughly merit-based approach to enlargement: an 
applicant’s place in the membership queue corresponds more or less to the 
progress it has made toward fulfilling the requirements. The effectiveness of EU 
leverage has depended upon this new, and still emerging, set of evaluative 
norms. Governments would cease to devote so much political capital to meeting 
the requirements of membership if it was obvious that the quality of preparations 
could be trumped by domestic politics in member states. While strict 
requirements mean a great deal of work for applicant states now, in principle 
they protect those applicants who, for structural reasons, are difficult for EU 
member states to absorb. For EU electorates, for example, it would be more 
popular to admit a state with a low potential to export workers – irrespective of 
                                                 
75 Vachudova 2000(a); and Emerson and Gros 1999. 
76 The tension between pro-Western reformers in government and nationalists in opposition 
was prominent during NATO’s airstrikes against the FRY. Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria’s 
Westernizing governments had to face the vigorous campaigns of nationalist political parties 
that condemned cooperation with NATO. See Vachudova 2000(b). 
32 RSC 2001/33 © 2001 Milada Anna Vachudova how well large swaths of the acquis have been adopted. 77 In this sense, at least 
in principle, a merit-based accession process creates rules which tie the hands of 
politicians not just in aspiring member states, but also in existing ones. 
 
  I have argued that (1) if EU membership is the best strategy for increasing 
welfare in a postcommunist European state, and (2) if EU membership can be 
obtained by meeting the domestic requirements, then it is possible to 
demonstrate how well the international cause of EU membership is served by 
domestic policy choices of different types of ruling elites. For some countries, 
however, the second assumption may be called into question: political elites in 
distant, poor and populous states may legitimately doubt that the EU will ever 
let them in, even if they fulfill the requirements. Given their economic 
backwardness and the weakness of their state administration, it will take years to 
meet the requirements. Given their distance from the EU’s borders, their 
political and economic success may be of less significance to West European 
leaders (and here geography unquestionably plays a role). It is very difficult to 
predict whether, in so many years, the commitment to enlargement will be kept. 
Indeed, the very fact that such a candidate is drawing closer to qualifying for 
membership may change preferences regarding enlargement as workers and 
agricultural goods are poised to enter the EU market: Existing EU member states 
may well violate the “meritocracy” rule and prevent accession.  
 
  Does the high uncertainty about the payoff of EU membership and the 
fact that it is so far in the future lower the value of membership so much that 
South East European are ultimately unwilling to make real efforts to meet EU 
requirements? I find that this is not the case: The potential pay-offs of 
membership are so great that it makes sense for a reform-oriented government to 
behave “as if” it is certain that the second assumption does hold: that 
enlargement will continue on the basis of merit. This makes sense only in the 
context of the popularity of EU accession among the electorate: If the 
Commission charges a government with little progress, this will have 
repercussions – especially if a country is clearly falling behind neighboring 
states. This makes even more sense in the context of the intermediary rewards 
the EU offers: financial assistance and foreign investment increase as 
membership draws closer. There are immediate sanctions to falling behind on 
work to achieve a long-term goal, even if its ultimate attainability is uncertain. 
This is itself a powerful indication of the importance of EU leverage on the 




                                                 
77 On public opinion and enlargement, Leigh 2000; and Bozoki 2001. 
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has created a unique laboratory for studying the domestic sources of foreign 
policy. This is so because EU membership is a foreign policy goal that, if taken 
seriously, must be reflected in almost every aspect of domestic policymaking in 
an applicant state. As a result, the possibility of attaining EU membership 
provides a ready test of the argument of liberal theory that the relationship 
between state and society determines the tenor of a state’s foreign policy – as 
opposed to a state’s prowess and position in the international system.  
 
In this article, I identified a liberal and a nationalist pattern of political 
change among East European states. I then showed how the cost to governing 
elites of fulfilling the EU’s domestic requirements varied between the two 
groups of states according to the elites’ dependence on ethnic nationalism and 
economic corruption to win and keep political power. While the incentives of 
EU membership were uniform and enormous for both groups, in nationalist 
pattern states power was concentrated in the hands of a small group of elites 
whose political and economic strategies violated EU membership requirements. 
The way that these elites governed thus violated the logic of any systemic theory 
of foreign policy. It also came at the expense of virtually all others in society, 
for whom moving towards EU membership would have been more beneficial. 
 
The EU had a causally important influence on the course of political 
change in East European states, but not right away. During the first period (1989 
to 1994), the EU’s “passive leverage” – the attraction of membership – only 
reinforced domestic strategies of reform in liberal pattern states. It failed to avert 
rent-seeking strategies of ethnic scapegoating and partial economic reform in 
nationalist pattern states. During the second period (1995 to 1999), the EU’s 
“active leverage” – centered on the extensive and well-enforced requirements of 
membership – shaped almost every area of domestic policymaking in some 15 
candidates and proto-candidates. For nationalist pattern states, the EU’s “active 
leverage” meant exclusion from the benefits of drawing closer to EU 
membership. But even active leverage failed to change the domestic policies of 
nationalist pattern governments. In the context of periodic elections, however, 
exclusion made rent-seeking strategies of ethnic scapegoating and economic 
corruption less tenable, and contributed to the victory of opposition political 
parties that organized themselves around a pro-EU platform. 
  
The most highly developed international institution in the world, the EU, 
also offers the greatest benefits of membership, insists on the most extensive 
requirements, and therefore exercises the greatest potential leverage on the 
domestic politics of credible future member states. This explains why 
democratization and economic reform in East European states have been 
materially affected by an external actor, the EU. This is in contrast to other 
states in the world where scholars have generally found that external actors have 
34 RSC 2001/33 © 2001 Milada Anna Vachudova a negligible impact on the course of democratization and economic reform. A 
key to the EU’s leverage is the meritocratic nature of the enlargement process. 
The EU’s form, an international institution open to all European states, 
combined with the Commission’s merit-based rules for a state’s promotion 
toward membership, created a dynamic process that has allowed EU leverage to 
influence domestic politics in a growing number of plausible candidate 
countries. 
 
The EU’s leverage represents a new field in the study of European 
integration and of international relations, and raises many fascinating questions 
for empirical study.  More important, the incentive of joining attractive 
international institutions increasingly compels potential members in other parts 
of the world to take steps toward consolidating economic reform, improving 
democracy and respecting minority rights. In the case of the EU, I have 
demonstrated that the substantial benefits combined with the extensive 
requirements of membership create the potential for states to embark on 
fundamental domestic transformations in order to qualify for membership. 
Changes in the world economy are raising the salience of international 
institutions to economic prosperity and present other cases for testing this 
hypothesis: Witness the difficult reforms that China is implementing in order to 
gain admittance to the World Trade Organization. The growing importance of 
international institutions and their insistence on ever more strenuous accession 
requirements may prove to be one of the most important international causes of 
domestic political and economic change in the coming decades. 
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